Secure communication is a necessity for some wireless sensor network (WSN) applications. However, the resource constraints of a sensor render existing cryptographic systems for traditional network systems impractical for a WSN. Random key predistribution scheme has been proposed to overcome these limits. In this scheme, a ring of keys is randomly drawn from a large key pool and assigned to a sensor. Nodes sharing common keys can communicate securely using a shared key, while a path-key is established for those nodes that do not share any common keys. This scheme requires moderate memory and processing power, thus it is considered suitable for WSN applications. However, since the shared key is not exclusively owned by the two end entities, the established path-key may be revealed to other nodes just by eavesdropping. Based on the random-key predistribution scheme, we present a framework that utilizes multiple proxies to secure the path-key establishment. Our scheme is resilient against node capture, collusive attack, and random dropping, while only incurring a small amount of overhead. Furthermore, the scheme ensures that, with high probability, all path-keys are exclusively known by the two end nodes involved in the communication along the path.
leave designers of security protocols for WSNs with no choice but to use symmetric-key cryptographic systems.
In symmetric-key cryptographic systems, keys have to be installed onto sensors before deployment. Nodes then use shared keys to conduct secure communication. Two strategies can be used to distribute shared keys between sensors in WSNs. In the first strategy, all sensor nodes share the same session key, while in the second case each sensor node shares a unique key with each of the remaining n − 1 sensors, where n is the total number of sensors in the WSN. The advantage of the first strategy stems from its low maintenance cost. In this strategy, however, the compromise of one single node may jeopardize the security of the entire network. The second strategy has potential to achieve perfect security even when a number of nodes are captured. In large WSNs, however, this approach requires installing n − 1 keys in each sensor and, as such, may be prohibitive, given the limited memory size of a sensor node. Furthermore, sensors are likely to fail due to hardware faults or energy depletion caused by excessive communication. Consequently, in order to maintain the level of node density required to meet the quality of service requirement of the applications, new sensors may have to be injected into the existing network. The addition of these nodes further limits the applicability of the second approach, as it requires installing new keys into the existing sensors in order to facilitate communication between these sensors and the newly injected ones.
To overcome the shortcomings of the above strategies, a random key predistribution scheme has been proposed [2] . This scheme only requires a relatively small number of keys, in the order of ten to one hundred, to be installed onto each node, to achieve connectivity between pair of nodes with high probability. The link with two end nodes sharing keys is called secure link. Nodes that do not share a key set up a path-key, through negotiation, using paths formed by secure links. The major shortcoming of this scheme is during pathkey establishment, communication between the end nodes is exposed to intermediate nodes along the path.
This path-key establishment problem has been introduced in [3] . Furthermore, it is shown that the risk of the path-key being revealed can be significantly decreased by using multiple node-disjoint secure paths to establish the pathkey. However, the proposed scheme may incur too much extra overhead due to the necessity of discovering multiple node-disjoint paths between sources and destinations.
In this paper, we aim to set up a framework that uses multiple secure-one-hop paths instead of node-disjoint paths to enhance the security of path-key establishment. We present two efficient algorithms for discovering these intermediate hops (referred as proxy). It is shown both through analysis and simulation that our scheme can achieve a very high level of security, while simultaneously reducing the overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related work. In Section 3, we describe our robust key establishment framework to secure the path-key using multiple proxies. Furthermore, we show how to discover such proxies in two algorithms. The security analysis and simulation results show that our scheme can achieve a high level of security. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
RELATED WORK
The random key predistribution scheme was first introduced by Eschenauer and Gligor [2] . Using this framework, different methods of key generation and distribution have been proposed to improve energy efficiency and security [4] [5] [6] [7] . A q-composite random key predistribution scheme has been proposed which increases the security of key set-up in way such that an attacker has to capture a large number of nodes to compromise a communication, with high probability [4] . The authors also propose a multipath-key reinforcement scheme to update an existing link key to a unique key, thereby ensuring that the key is not used by any other sensor node. Although the scheme proposed in this paper uses multiple paths, it differs from the one proposed in [4] in that the proposed scheme achieves the same level of security, without the need to use node-disjoint paths. Computing node-disjoint paths is known to be NP-hard, and, therefore, may result in considerable communication overhead.
In the random key predistribution scheme proposed in [5] , each node only needs to carry a fraction of the keys required by [2] , while achieving the same level of security. This scheme has the potential to reduce memory usage and improve the network's resilience against node compromise. To achieve this goal, however, the scheme requires prior knowledge of sensor deployment within the WSN, which may not be readily available at any time. Furthermore, if the sensor nodes are moving, the network topology changes, thereby making prior knowledge deployment obsolete. Deployment knowledge was also used in [8] to improve key predistribution. The authors further exploited postdeployment knowledge to discard keys in a node where the keys are not shared with the node's actual neighbors to thwart node compromise attacks and vacate the precious memory space to be used by the loaded applications.
Another location-based key predistribution scheme based on deployment knowledge is described in [9] . A distinguishing property of this framework from the above schemes is that it does not require the knowledge of sensors' expected locations, but only requires to deploy sensor nodes in groups. Consequently the burden to deploy each sensor in the sensor network to the vicinity of its expected location is greatly reduced. However, since sensors are deployed in groups, node addition and key revocation in existing nodes are not easy for this network.
In [10] a seed-based key deployment strategy to discover shared keys, in a more energy-efficient manner, is described. All the keys in the key pool are indexed. Each node uses its ID as the seed and uses a pseudorandom function to generate the key indexes. It then loads the corresponding keys onto itself. This scheme requires more memory space as nodes have to store the associated indexes along with the keys. The scheme may also require additional computation, but no communication is required for two nodes to discover if they share a key between them.
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The schemes described in [7] use a similar technique to discover shared keys. Although these new schemes save communication, they pose a security threat. After capturing a node, an attacker can gain additional advantage by selectively eavesdropping on nodes that are known to share keys with the captured one.
To prevent this attack, the key distribution strategy proposed in this paper adopts the original scheme described in [2] . Notice that the scheme described in [10] also sets up path-keys using different logic paths. However, the scheme cannot use the original shared key mechanism to discover these logic paths.
Both [4, 6] propose a scheme to support key authentication by generating unique pairwise keys. In [4] , a node loads a set of node IDs and a unique pairwise key k is generated for each pair of nodes. Hence, if k is used to secure communication, both nodes are certain of their respective identities, since no other node pair can hold k. In [6] the random key predistribution is combined with Blom's key predistribution scheme [4] to achieve "λ-security." This level of security is achieved only if an adversary cannot compromise more than λ nodes; uncompromised nodes remain perfectly secure. When more than λ nodes are captured, the entire network may be compromised if just one key space is used.
While the security of random key predistribution schemes has made significant improvement, the path-key establishment problem has not yet been fully addressed [3] . In this paper, we propose to improve the path-key security using multiple secure proxies.
ROBUST PATH-KEY ESTABLISHMENT
We first review Gligor's work upon which our work is based and give an example to highlight the main idea. In his scheme, each node is installed with a key ring of m keys randomly drawn from a large key pool, P. This scheme requires moderate memory space for storing a key ring, and therefore can be used in a very large network. For example, if a key ring consists of 20 keys and is drawn from 1000 keys, theoretically it can support up to ( 1000 20 ) = 2.4 × 10 19 nodes, and only requires 160 bytes assuming 64-bit key cryptography system. After being deployed, two nodes within transmission range exchange either key identifiers or challenges to discover common keys in their key rings. Then a common key is selected for secure communication between these two nodes. Node pairs without a common key establish a path-key through a secure path.
In the network depicted in Figure 1 , it is assumed that shared keys have been discovered as illustrated by dashed links. According to this example, N1 shares a key with N2 but not with N3 or N4. When N1 wants to communicate with N3, it finds a secure path N1 → N2 → N4 → N3 and sends a key K to N3 through the established path. K is encrypted with K 12 , K 24 , and K 34 , respectively, as it travels from N1 to N3. Notice, however, that while the pairwise key K is supposed to be exclusively shared between N1 and N3, the need for successive decryptions and encryptions along the path causes the key to be exposed to the intermediate nodes N2 and N4. This may lead to potential security compromise if a node along the path is captured. This problem is referred as the "path-key establishment problem" in [3] .
Another security concern about this framework is that the probability of any two nodes sharing keys is high. In the last example, the probability is 33.5%. If the key ring size is increased to 30, the probability will be over 60.5%. Any key in the key pool has a probability equal to (key ring size/key pool size) to be installed on one node. In a large WSN, if two nodes are using a shared key to talk to each other, chances are, there will be some nodes in the neighborhood that hold this shared key they are using. This situation demands that two nodes set up a path-key for a private communication even if they shared keys on their key rings.
Using multiple node-disjoint paths to secure the pathkey establishment has been proposed to cope with the risk that compromising one node along the path leads to revealing the path-key [3] . A path-key K is broken down into k nuggets and sent along k node-disjoint paths. All nuggets are required to reconstruct K. Therefore, an attacker would have to capture at least one node along each path to obtain the key. However, as pointed out above, these key nuggets are exposed to each intermediate node along the routing path. In summary, this scheme has the following undesirable features.
(i) It involves a high level of overhead to find nodedisjoint paths. Furthermore, in some cases, it may not be physically feasible to construct k node-disjoint paths. (ii) Contrary to intuition, increasing the number of nodedisjoint paths does not necessarily improve the level of security of the underlying path-key establishment scheme. This is because as the number of node-disjoint paths increases, so does the number of intermediate nodes. This in turn increases the chances of the pathkey being exposed to adversaries.
To reduce the exposure of the key nugget along the path, the proposed scheme ensures that no more than one node along a path knows the key nugget. This node is referred to as a proxy. The proxy shares a key with each end node, respectively. Now that the key nugget is secured by the proxy, 4 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking it becomes feasible to relax the node-disjoint requirement of the k paths without increasing the vulnerability of the pathkey. Furthermore, since these paths no longer require to be composed of secure links only, any physical path(e.g., the shortest path) between the proxy and the end nodes discovered by the underlying routing protocol can be used.
The fact that nodes share keys with high probability leads to the following two observations. On one hand, it imposes threat to reveal the key nuggets because of the exposure. On the other hand, it leaves a large number of nodes to act as proxies that can secure key nuggets exchanged between end nodes. Only the compromise of the proxy will cause the associated key nugget to be revealed. Consequently, the security level of establishing a path-key will increase monotonically with the number of secured paths. Based on this observation, we propose path-key establishment scheme which leverages multiple secure paths with only one proxy for key negotiation and establishment. We propose two simple algorithms to find these proxies and compare the response time and communication overhead in terms of average number of hops and number of nodes involved to find a proxy.
If one attacker is not aiming to figure out the communication content but to cripple the system instead, he can just do so by dropping one or more of the key nuggets. To increase the robustness of the key establishment, a (k, m) threshold scheme described in [11] is adopted in our framework. In a (k, m) threshold scheme, k out of m secret shares are required to reconstruct the secret. This scheme is based on polynomial interpolation: given k points in the 2-dimensional plane (x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x k , y k ), with distinct x i 's, there is one and only one polynomial P(x) of degree k − 1 such that y i = P(x i ) for all i's. Suppose K is the path-key we randomly choose for communication. To break down K into m pieces, we randomly construct a polynomial of de-
. Given any subset of k pairs of these values, we can recover the coefficients of P(x) by interpolation, then evaluate K = P(0). However, P(x) cannot be uniquely identified by less than k value pairs.
Notice that we avoid using preset x values, as in the case of the work described in [11] , so that the attacker cannot gain any advantages by known-plain-text attack. For detailed description of a (k, m) threshold scheme, readers are referred to [11] .
The following assumptions are made in our scheme and security analysis. The notations used throughout the paper are listed in Table 1 . 
End-to-end key establishment scheme
Consider a network with a total number of n nodes, where each node has been loaded with a key ring drawn from a large key pool. Furthermore, assume that node u wants to set up a path-key with another node v to start a private communication. This can be achieved using the following steps.
(i) u sends out its key ID list to invite v to set up a pathkey.
, where a k−1 = 0 and K = a 0 . v constructs m key nuggets each of which contains a randomly selected value x and its corresponding value P(x). (iii) v then selects m proxies using one of the two approaches presented in the following section to transmit these m key nuggets to u. (iv) Upon receiving k or more nuggets, node u reconstructs the key K by interpolation using the value pair (x, P(x)) carried by each nugget and uses it to securely communicate with v.
Notice that the proposed scheme does not depend on the algorithm used to produce a key. Consequently, any preassigned algorithm to produce a secure key can be adopted. An issue, which is not addressed in the above scheme, is how to select m proxies. We propose two simple methods to solve this issue. Notice that if u and v share a key, v can act as its own proxy.
The basic steps of first method to discover m proxies can be described as follows. The procedures used by node v and candidate node to select m proxies are outlined in Algorithm 3.1. The second method is described as follows and is sketched in Algorithm 3.1.
(i) v creates a request packet and set its time-to-live (TTL) field to t before locally flooding it into the network. The value of t may be set to reflect the density of the node within the neighborhood. For dense networks, the value of t should be small while a large value of t may be required for sparse networks. Based on Algorithm 3.1, node v selects m neighbors and sends each one of them a proxy request packet. Nodes can be repeatedly selected if v has less than m direct neighbors. Notice that a request copy ceases to travel when received by a proxy. Consequently, at most m copies of the original requests exist in the network at any time. However, depending on the key distribution, a request may incur a large delay before discovering a proxy. If the probability of two nodes sharing keys is p, then the probability that a node shares key with two other nodes is p 2 . On average, one request will need to travel 1/ p 2 nodes on average to find a proxy. Algorithm 3.1 discovers proxies faster than Algorithm 3.1. This is specially true in dense WSNs. This algorithm, however, involves more nodes than Algorithm 3.1 because of the local flooding.
A simulation experiment was set up to compare the performance of these two algorithms. In this experiment, 1000 nodes are randomly distributed over a 100 × 100 square area. The radio range was varied to be 6, 8, and 12 to generate networks with different densities. In this experiment, a path-key is fragmented into 5 nuggets, therefore, 5 proxies are necessary to communicate the path-key between two end nodes. One hundred pairs of end nodes are randomly selected for 1000/20 and 1000/30 choices of pool size and ring size. Figure 2 shows the average number of hops to find a proxy. Figure 3 depicts the average number of nodes involved in discovering one proxy.
The result shows if p is large, the first approach is preferred, while the second approach should be used if the network is dense. It is therefore important that the choice of parameter p and the proxy selection method be carefully decided prior to deployment. Alternatively, a node can dynamically adapt its proxy selection strategy to use the appropriate method based on current characteristics of the network.
In further considering the simulation result, it must be pointed out that the proxies discovered by the first approach may not be physically located many hops away from node v as Figure 2 leads to believe. These proxies may actually reside within the vicinity of node v, but have been discovered through a lateral path connecting neighboring nodes located within a small number of physical hops away from node v. In fact, based on the simulation results, the sets of proxies discovered by these two approaches exhibit a large overlap. Using either approach, only local nodes are involved in path-key establishment. Consequently the performance of the proposed scheme is independent of the network size. It only depends on the key predistribution as such a scheme scales to large-size networks.
Using the (k, m) threshold scheme, only k out of m key nuggets are required to obtain the path-key. This can ensure defending, with high probability, against random-dropping attacks staged from a captured node. However, risk still exists if the captured node sits on the crossing point of several paths between m proxies and nodes u and v and drops all the key nuggets passing through it so that not enough key nuggets can be obtained to reconstruct the path-key. Therefore, node-disjoint paths are preferred whenever possible. Techniques to find node-disjoint paths can be found in [12, 13] . Note that since all the m proxies are well dispersed around node v, the cost of finding node-disjoint paths connecting u to v can be significantly smaller in comparison to finding m node-disjoint paths directly between these two nodes.
Security analysis
The security analysis of our scheme focuses on two aspects, namely secrecy or privacy of the system and security against node capture. With respect to secrecy, the scheme must not allow any node other than the end nodes to know the shared path-key. The second aspect focuses on the likelihood that an attacker who captures a certain number of nodes may be able to obtain the key. To evaluate the secrecy of the system, we determine the probability that x collusive nodes may cover the keys from at least k proxies used to encrypt nuggets during the path-key establishment phase, thereby violating the end nodes' exclusive path-key sharing property. The vulnerability of the system to node capture is measured by computing the likelihood that an attacker who captures x nodes may obtain at least k key nuggets.
For simplicity, we assume that there are 2m distinct keys used to secure key nuggets by m proxies. In this case, colluding nodes will need to have both keys used by one proxy to be sure that they can correctly obtain the key nugget being transported by that proxy. Consider a set of x collusive nodes. The probability, P r , for one of the 2m keys to be installed onto a given network node is P r = key ring size/key pool size = R/P. Then the probability of this key being contained in the union of the x colluding nodes is 1 − (1 − P r ) x . Therefore, the probability, P x , that colluding x nodes cover at least k pairs of keys used to secure the key nuggets is
Note this probability is independent of the number of nodes deployed. As such, this probability defines the system security for a given key pool size and key ring size. Furthermore, these m proxies may use less than m pairs of keys to secure m key nuggets. Consequently, (1) gives a lower bound of the probability that a set of x collusive nodes cover at least k pairs of the keys used to securely set up the path-key. Figure 4 depicts the probability of x collusive nodes covering at least k pairs of keys. We observe that as x increases, P x increases rapidly. It is desired that we keep P r small, however, this will affect the choice of method to discover the proxies. It is left to the designer to choose appropriate network specification given a required security level. Furthermore, we can use the cooperation scheme in [7] , whereby a proxy uses all the keys that it shares with one end node to encrypt the key nugget to further reduce the likelihood of at least k pairs of keys being covered.
Another observation, which can be made based on the results of Figure 4 , is that even when k = 3 and m = 5, a set of 50 colluding nodes is required to recover at least k key nuggets with probability of 45.4%. It is therefore unlikely that a smaller number of colluding nodes can determine the pathkey by overhearing the traffic.
The vulnerability of the network to node capture depends on the ability of the attacker to acquire the key nuggets directly. If either u or v is captured, the path-key is revealed. In a network of n nodes, if x (x > m) nodes are captured, the probability, P 1 , that one or both end nodes are among these nodes is The probability, P 2 , that x nodes contain no end nodes but cover at least k proxies is
where p is the probability that two nodes share keys. The factor (1− p) in (3) accounts for the fact that m proxies are used. Hence, the probability P c of all keys shared being revealed after the capture of x nodes is 
We can see that the first term in (4) is solely dependent on the scale of the network deployment and the number of nodes captured. No scheme can protect the capture of communicating end nodes unless the nodes are tamper-proof. We are therefore more interested in the second term which Guanfeng Li et al. 
) as a function of x is depicted in Figure 5 , for n = 1000 and various values of k and m. P is the probability that at least k proxies are among those x captured nodes.
Based on the result, a satisfactory security level (7 × 10 −3 %) can be achieved even when a large percentage of nodes (5%) are captured and k is small with endurance of 2 packets loss (k = 4, m = 6). Furthermore, there is a noticeable jump from k = 3 to k = 4 in all cases which suggests that we invest a little more using 4 instead of 3 proxies whenever possible to achieve a big security improvement.
There are obviously trade-offs among the choices of values for k and m. Larger m incurs more overhead but leaves more room for robustness consideration. Larger k means more security yet less robustness. In the extreme case when m = k, there is zero tolerance for lost packets. Users should pick up values for k and m according to the security, energy budget, and robustness requirements of their applications.
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the path-key establishment exposure problem commonly encountered in key predistribution schemes in WSNs. We propose a robust path-key establishment framework, which uses multiple secured paths for the negotiation and exchange of symmetric keys between end nodes. Since the scheme ensures that each key share can be revealed only to one node on each path, the exposure of that key nugget is minimized. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme can greatly improve the security of key establishment. Furthermore this scheme assumes no specific routing protocols, and therefore, it is not dependent on the physical topology of the network. As long as the network is connected and there are enough nodes deployed, the proposed scheme can be incorporated to most key predistribution schemes without significant changes. Robustness is achieved through redundant information such that not all packets are required to obtain the key.
